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Over the past few decades, the issue of workplace sexual harassment has
finally entered into mainstream discourse and is no longer limited to male-
female relations. As sexual minorities' are becoming more vocal in demand-
ing equal rights, people are beginning to recognize that the same type of
sexual harassment in the workplace that has been perpetrated against women
is being perpetrated against gay men and lesbians.
Unfortunately, allegations of "same-sex" harassment have, for the most
part, been met with disfavor in the courts.2 Title VII makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate on the basis of sex.3 The courts have struggled with
whether same-gender sexual harassment can be motivated "because of sex."
Most courts have interpreted the word "sex" in its narrowest sense to mean
biological sex, which is determined by a person's genitalia.4 Based on that
interpretation, these courts will find a cause of action only where the conduct
at issue was motivated by the employee's physically being male or female.
Courts have either explicitly or by unspoken assumption singled out X and Y
chromosomes as the sole determinants of a person's gender, failing to con-
sider how the employee self-identifies or how society perceives and defines
the gender role and performance of the employee.
* Assistant Professor, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., 1988, Williams
College; J.D., 1992, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M., 1997, Temple School of Law. I
am especially grateful to Nancy Knauer and Hillary Siegel for bringing this paper up a notch. I
would also like to thank Rick Greenstein, and Ruthann Robson, for their insightful suggestions,
and my research assistants Jamie Kovatch, Michael Hayes, and Alexis Baden-Mayer for all their
hard work.
1. I use the term "sexual minorities" to signify lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals,
and bi/transgendered people.
2. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff has no cognizable claim for sexual harassment where both victim and
alleged harasser are heterosexuals of same sex); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that male subordinate has no cognizable sexual harassment claim against
male supervisor). While this article was in press, the United States Supreme Court held that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII if it is "because of sex." Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at *2 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998). Despite
this seemingly favorable ruling for victims of same-sex sexual harassment, the Court's decision
limits recovery to a very narrow set of circumstances where the harassment occurs because of the
plaintiff's biological sex. See id. at *4; see also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text and note
87.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
4. See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96 (explaining that involved heterosexual male-on-
male conduct did not occur "specifically 'because' of the victim's sex").
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The term "sex" embodies many interrelated factors, including chromo-
somes, genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, gender traits, and sexuality.
Traditionally, each of these concepts was thought to embody duality-all
people were thought to be either male or female (duality in chromosomes,
genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics), masculine or feminine (duality
in gender traits), and sexually attracted to only males or only females (duality
in sexuality). A person's biological chromosomes and genitalia were used as
the determinant of all the other factors. That is, a person with male genitalia
was expected to act masculinely and to be sexually attracted to females, and
vice versa.
When all five factors converge in one person, the courts are not called
upon to grapple with all the ideas embodied in the term "sex." Issues of sex,
sexuality, and gender roles, however, are no longer as simple as they used to
be. Reality suggests there is no intrinsic or stable sexual or gender identity.
5
Scientific advances have brought about the medical capability of altering
one's biological sex. Feminist and gay advocacy has resulted in a greater
awareness and acceptance of sexual minorities and fewer expectations re-
garding traditional gender roles. It is not uncommon to see women working
in physically challenging jobs such as the military or as CEO's of big corpora-
tions-jobs that were traditionally reserved for men. Likewise, more men
are taking on the traditionally female nurturing role, taking a more active
role in the rearing of their children. It is now abundantly clear that there is a
spectrum of sexes, and gender roles, and a person's sexual identity is not
always based on his or her biological organs.
By assuming that maleness and femaleness are two opposing, easily de-
fined, and mutually exclusive categories, the courts perpetuate stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes and exclude from protection those people who
are singled out for adverse treatment in the workplace based on their failure
to conform to gender stereotypes. The result is confusing jurisprudence
which has a disparate impact on sexual minorities.6 By defining "sex" restric-
tively as "biological sex," courts have chosen the least relevant aspect of
"sex" as a determinant of whether a person has a cause of action under Title
VII.7 This narrow interpretation of Title VII conflicts with its underlying
purpose-failing to assure a work environment free of discriminatory ridicule
for all people.
The courts' narrow and simplistic reading of the statute ignores the real-
ity that sexual harassment is based on power, not on sexual attraction.
8
Power exists independently of biological sex. Men can be targets of sexual
5. See infra notes 74, 80 and 81 and accompanying text.
6. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
7. See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191.
8. See Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation
as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 105, 112 (1995) (explain-
ing that desire of heterosexual men to maintain power and dominance is motivation behind
sexual harassment).
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harassment for a variety of reasons. 9 For example, a man in a low level job
can be a target of a female boss,10 and gender performance can reinforce
certain assumptions about power." Based on socially constructed norms,
certain masculine gender traits have come to be associated with power and
success, while anything feminine has come to be devalued in the workplace.
Therefore, anyone, male or female, who exhibits feminine characteristics can
be a target for sexual harassment. The outdated assumption espoused by
many courts that sexual harassment can only occur between men and women
lacks insight into the depth of ways one person can assert power over an-
other, the ubiquity of power relations within sexuality, and the complex rela-
tionships between sex, sexuality, and power.
Title VII is a remedial statute that, under established rules of construc-
tion, should be interpreted broadly. 12 Accordingly, courts should interpret
"because of sex" in its broadest sense to mean not only biological sex, but
also anything relating to sexual issues, behavior, anatomy, or identity, as long
as the harassment implicates and exploits power imbalances between the
sexes. This more flexible approach to Title VII will allow courts to shift the
focus from the sex, gender or sexual preference of the victim, to the nature of
the harassing conduct, the motivation behind it, and its effect on perpetuating
gender imbalances and stereotypes in the workplace.
I. BACKGROUND
Imagine the following scene: several men in your office take a disliking
to you. Your male supervisor and co-workers tease and taunt you on a daily
basis. Their actions range from verbally abusive conduct such as name-call-
ing, teasing, and challenging your sexuality, to physical abuse such as grab-
bing your crotch, physically holding you down and exposing themselves to
you, and actually threatening to rape you. Under Title VII you would proba-
bly expect to have a cause of action for such profoundly abhorrent behavior,
as there is little doubt it would unreasonably interfere with your work. You
would be right if you were a woman. If you were a man, however, you would
probably not have a cause of action. 13 It is precisely this type of despicable
9. Although the argument below applies in varying degrees to all sexual harassment cases,
this Article focuses exclusively on hostile environment sexual harassment involving two men.
10. See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(noting that female supervisor asked male service person if "the color of the skin on his arm
matched that on his penis"), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997).
11. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
12. See Miller v. Vesta Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating "[it is not the
courts' role to limit the protections Congress conferred by selecting broad and general
language").
13. Although the United States Supreme Court recently found that same-sex sexual harass-
ment is actionable under Title VII, its decision is limited in scope, insofar as the harassment must
be motivated by animus or hostility toward all men or all women. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998). It remains to be seen
how the lower courts will apply the Oncale decision, but it is likely that, based on a literal read-
ing of the case, the conduct described above would not be considered sexual harassment. See
infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text and note 87.
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conduct which courts have stated with overwhelming consistency is inexcus-
able in the workplace, 14 that is the subject of many same-sex sexual harass-
ment lawsuits.15 The debate regarding same-sex sexual harassment in the
workplace does not focus on where we should draw the line between inno-
cent or playful teasing and hostile and abusive conduct, or whether the plain-
tiff is too sensitive or unable to take a joke. The question goes more deeply
to the core of our understanding of civil rights, asking whether all or just
some people are entitled to a work environment free of sexual intimidation
and humiliation.
In 1981, the first United States District Court faced the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment.' 6 In Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., a male
plaintiff brought an action against his former employer alleging that he was
discharged because he rejected homosexual advances made toward him by
his supervisor.' 7 The District Court held that if the plaintiff could show that
"but for" his sex he would not have been subjected to his supervisor's con-
duct, the plaintiff could recover under Title VII. 1 8
The Fifth Circuit became the first United States Court of Appeals to
address the issue of same-sex harassment in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America.19 The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions, a plant foreman
"grab[bed]" his "crotch area and ma[de] sexual motions from behind. '20 Cit-
ing an unpublished opinion, the court stated that sexual harassment by a
male supervisor against another male was not actionable under Title VII.21
Following Garcia, the Fifth Circuit heard another case involving same-
sex sexual harassment. In the case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,22 a male plaintiff alleged that his male supervisor assisted another male
co-worker in holding him down as another male co-worker touched the plain-
tiff's neck and arm with his penis. The allegations also included threats of
homosexual rape and forceful anal penetration involving a bar of soap.23
The circuit court noted that district courts had widely criticized and rejected
the Garcia decision.24 However, the court was bound to follow Garcia as
precedent because, in the Fifth Circuit, one panel could not override the deci-
sion of another. 25 Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, no occurrence of same-sex sex-
ual harassment would be actionable under Title VII.
14. See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
15. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90
F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191; Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446 (5th Cir. 1994).
16. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
17. See id. at 310.
18. See id.
19. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
20. Id. at 448.
21. See id. at 451-52 (citing Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished)).
22. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998).
23. See id. at 118-19.
24. See id. at 119.
25. See id.
[Vol. 7:395
WHEN MEN HARASS MEN
The Fourth Circuit soon followed in the path of the Fifth Circuit. In
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,26 the Fourth Circuit
heard a case involving a claim of hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment. The male plaintiff worked as a mechanic. His male co-workers called
themselves "lube boys," and subjected the plaintiff to various forms of unwel-
come sexual behavior. This behavior included teasing the plaintiff about sex-
ual matters, exposing themselves to the plaintiff, and actual physical assaults
such as blindfolding the plaintiff, forcing him to his knees, and simulating oral
sex with a finger in his mouth.
27
The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff's claim failed as both the al-
leged harassers and the victim were heterosexual males.2 8 The court asserted
that the result was "compelled by a commonsense reading of the critical cau-
sation language of the statute .... -29 Specifically, the harassment was not
"because of" the plaintiff's sex. 30 While the court described the conduct as
"shameful," it could not find that such actions by a heterosexual male against
another heterosexual male were "because of sex."' 31 The court noted that
"this sort of behavior is utterly despicable," that "it may rise to levels that
adversely affect the victim's work performance, . . . and that no employer
should tolerate it .... -32 Nonetheless, the court concluded that to interpret
Title VII to reach conduct where only heterosexual males were involved,
would extend the protection beyond its intended purpose to "unmanageably
broad protection of the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of sex."'
33
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit created a split in the federal circuit courts
through its decision in Quick v. Donaldson Company.34 The case involved
the verbal and physical harassment of Quick, a male plaintiff, by male co-
workers. One specific practice was that of "bagging." While the court noted
that "bagging" had been defined in many ways, all of the practices seemed to
involve a male using his hand to touch another male in the groin. 35 Despite
complaints by Quick to his supervisor, the "bagging" incidents continued.
36
In one incident, the co-workers squeezed Quick's left testicle so hard, it pro-
duced swelling and bruising.37 In addition, Quick, a heterosexual, endured
verbal harassment because his male co-workers believed that he was homo-
sexual.38 The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that a male could only state a claim of sexual harassment
26. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
27. See id. at 1193.




32. Id. at 1196.
33. Id.
34. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
35. See id. at 1374.
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when he could "show an anti-male or a predominantly female environment
making males a disadvantaged or vulnerable group in the workplace and
treating female employees differently and more favorably. '39
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, noting that
"the key inquiry is whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta-
geous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed." 40 As the record from the court below was absent of any
"bagging" incidents involving female employees, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. 41
Very recently, the Seventh Circuit added to the array of same-sex harass-
ment cases in Doe v. Belleville.42 In a case involving all heterosexual parties,
the court held that sexual harassment of a man by other men is actionable
under Title VII.43 The plaintiffs in that case were two sixteen year-old twin
brothers. 44 One of the brothers, J. Doe, was overweight, and was nicknamed
by his co-workers the "fat boy."'45 H. Doe, the main target of the abuse, was
called the "fag" or the "queer" because he wore an earring.46 One co-
worker, Jeff Dawe, regularly called H. his "bitch" and threatened to take him
"out to the woods" and "get [him] up the ass." 47 Other co-workers, including
the boys' supervisor, joined in the abuse, calling both boys names and en-
couraging Dawe to take H. out and "get a piece of that young ass." 48 The
abuse turned physical when Dawe proclaimed, "I'm going to finally find out
if you are a girl or a guy," and proceeded to back H. into a comer and grab
his testicles.49
The Seventh Circuit held that H. Doe was harassed "because of sex," if
not because of "the sexual character of the harassment itself," then because
of "the harassers' evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did not
conform to male standards." 50 Holding that the sexual preference of the har-
asser is immaterial in hostile work environment cases, the court noted:
[W]e doubt that it would have mattered for H. Doe to know, when
his testicles were in Dawe's grasp, that Dawe was heterosexual or
(as his deposition reveals) that he lived with a woman, and thus that
he may not have been sexually interested in H. The experience was
still humiliating in a deeply personal way, as only sexual acts can
be.5'
39. Id. at 1375-76.
40. Id. at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
41. See id. at 1379.
42. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
43. See id. at 574.
44. See id. at 566-67.
45. See id. at 566.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 567.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 575.
51. Id. at 580.
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The court explained that to constitute sexual harassment, the conduct
need not be an overt sexual advance-that is, the harasser need not have a
desire to have sex with the victim. 52 Any overtly sexual and sex-based con-
duct in the workplace is prohibited by Title VII.53 When the harassment is
not explicitly sexual, it can still be gender-based when it is "visited upon
workers of one gender but not the other."54 This test is met when harass-
ment is based on gender stereotypes:
a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is
slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits
his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of
how men are to appear and behave, is harassed 'because of' his
sex. 55
The court also found that the name-calling, the references to sexual assault,
and the intrusive, intimate touching all expressly invoked H.'s gender. 56 In
all likelihood, the court observed, the defendants' intent was to humiliate H.
as a man. 57
This split in the circuits over whether same-sex sexual harassment is ac-
tionable under Title VII led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on a re-
cent Fifth Circuit case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.58 In a
unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that same-sex sexual harass-
ment is actionable under Title VII.59 The Court reasoned that although
male-on-male sexual harassment was not the principal evil with which Con-
gress was concerned when it enacted Title VII, "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
legislators by which we are governed."6
While this landmark decision could potentially have an important impact
on the workplace environment, the holding is limited in a way that leaves
open many questions of application. In response to the concern that Title
VII will expand into "a general civility code for the American workplace," 61
the Court assured that the harassment, even if perpetrated by someone of the
same sex as the victim, must be motivated by "general hostility to the pres-
ence of [one sex] in the workplace."'62 Thus, the Court's analysis focuses ex-
clusively on biological sex, limiting sexual harassment to situations where the




55. Id. at 581.
56. See id. at 580.
57. See id.
58. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997), rev'd, No. 96-568, 1998
WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998).
59. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4,
1998).
60. Id. at *3.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *4.
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cluded from protection is the effeminate or sexually prudish man who is sin-
gled out by his male coworkers or employers and teased, taunted and
ridiculed because he does not conform to traditional and expected gender
roles.
II. ANALYSIS
There are two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the
"hostile environment" claim and the "quid pro quo" claim. Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when a tangible or economic benefit of employ-
ment is conditioned upon the target's submission to a request for sexual fa-
vors.6 3 For example, firing an employee for refusing sexual advances
constitutes quid pro quo sex discrimination under Title VII.64 A hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim arises when harassment is "sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment. '65 In same-sex harassment cases of
the quid pro quo variety in which the superior requests sexual favors from
the same-sex subordinate, the harasser is presumed to be sexually attracted
to the employee-that is, the employer is presumed to be gay.66 Most courts
have found a cause of action in those cases based on the apparent fact that
the harassment is targeted at employees of only one sex.67
By contrast, when the alleged harassment takes the form of hostile work
environment, the challenged conduct does not involve sexual advances, but
rather crude sexual jokes, persistent taunting and sexual touching. Most of
these suits are brought by an employee who either is homosexual, is per-
ceived to be homosexual, or has heightened sensibilities (i.e. finds comments
of a sexual nature distasteful) against a heterosexual employer.68 Courts are
less sympathetic to the plaintiffs in these cases, and less willing to recognize
that such conduct occurs because of sex.69
Same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace is most often perpetrated
through the unwanted sexual advances upon females by lesbians (quid pro
63. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
64. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976).
65. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
66. See id. at 65.
67. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Ind.- Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1996); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc.,
911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337-38
(E.D. Va. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1101-02 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995);
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
68. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th 1997) (explaining that main target of
harassment deemed by perpetrators as "fag" or "queer").
69. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir.
1996); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1052-53 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Easton v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
1997); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Va. 1995), afJ'd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir.
1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Goluszek v.
H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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quo harassment), or taunts by males toward gay or effeminate men involving
crude discussions of sexuality (hostile work environment harassment). 70 Be-
cause quid pro quo harassment tends to be motivated in greater part by sex-
ual attraction, while hostile environment harassment tends to be motivated in
greater part by animosity toward the victim, the analyses of these two types
of sexual harassment are quite different. Additionally, although stereotyped
expectations of men and women affect all men and women, the influences
and outcomes of such stereotyping are not uniform. 71 A woman exhibiting
masculine characteristics is often more readily accepted than a man who ex-
hibits feminine ones.72 Thus, although the interpretations and ideas pro-
posed below apply in varying degrees to any type of sexual harassment, this
Article will focus on hostile environment sexual harassment involving two
men for illustrations and explanations.
The rationale behind the different treatment of quid pro quo and hostile
environment cases stems from the courts' interpretation of the phrase "be-
cause of sex" in Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual . ..because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ,,73 There is much debate about the
meaning of "sex" in the context of Title VII. The word is complex, multi-
faceted, and ambiguous, meaning either biological sex (male or female), core
gender identity (woman or man), gender role identity (feminine or mascu-
line), or sexual behavior.74 The legislative history of Title VII does not offer
much help in defining the word "sex." The inclusion of the word "sex" came
as a result of a floor amendment by Representative Howard Smith, an oppo-
nent of Title VII.75 Smith proposed the amendment apparently in "satire
and iron cajolery" to inspire opponents to vote against the bill. 76 The bill
passed as amended, however, with little debate on the issue of sex
discrimination. 77
To understand the broad meaning of the term "sex," it is necessary to
understand the meaning of its component parts. As a biological denotation,
sex (male or female) generally denotes "the physical attributes of bodies,
70. See Craig, supra note 8, at 108 (making observation based upon intake calls from indi-
viduals seeking legal assistance from Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund from June
1993 through January 1995).
71. See MARIANNE HESTER ET AL., WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND MALE POWER 38 (1996).
72. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
74. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
75. See Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to
Re-examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VIi's Ban on Discrimination "Because of Sex, " 27
CuMa. L. REV. 231, 235-36 (1997).
76. See id. at 236 n.28 (citing Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REV. 431, 441-42 (1996)).
77. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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specifically the external genitalia,"'78 and has been viewed as relatively immu-
table.79 Gender (masculinity and femininity), on the other hand, is cultural,
socially constructed, and mutable.80 Gender is used to "describe personality
attributes and socio-sexual roles that society understands to be 'masculine' or
'feminine' and which society ascribes on the basis of sex."'81
Over time, biological sex has become conflated with gender; maleness is
conflated with masculinity and femaleness with femininity. From social expe-
rience, a person comes to expect males to conform to certain roles that have
been repeated over time and habitualized, and females to conform to certain
other roles.82 Society (and the law) have learned to view biological sex as the
determinant of gender. The conflation of sex and gender has historically and
popularly been accepted as a truism: "persons born with penises are sup-
posed to exhibit a particular social personality and persons born with vaginas
another; if not, they are disclaimed as 'sissies' or 'tomboys." 83
Many courts have fallen prey to this conflationary status quo in their
interpretation of the word "sex." When courts state that the term "sex" in
Title VII refers to "gender," 84 they are generally referring to "an individual's
distinguishing biological or anatomical characteristics. ' 85 In effect, courts
have precluded claims based on the victim's self-identified and socially con-
structed gender and limited sex discrimination to conduct or treatment which
would not have occurred but for the plaintiff's biological sex. Based on that
interpretation, some courts have specifically held that Title VII protection for
hostile work environment does not extend to victims who are the samesex as
their harassers.86 Other courts have held that although male-on-male con-
duct is theoretically actionable, a plaintiff may not prevail unless he can meet
the heavy burden of proving that the conduct created an "anti-male bias" or
"anti-male atmosphere" in the workplace. 87 Those courts assume, for exam-
78. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender
& Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 164 (1996).
79. The possibility of sex change operations, of course, changes that fact.
80. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 25 (1990) (stating "[t]here is no gender identity
behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expres-
sions' that are said to be its results").
81. Id.
82. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LucKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAL-
rry: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 48-74 (1967).
83. Valdes, supra note 78, at 166.
84. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 23941 (1989)); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662
(9th Cir. 1977); Shoiber v. Emro Marketing Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 734 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Dobre v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
85. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 286.
86. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
87. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., for example, the Supreme Court explained:
A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female vic-
tim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make
it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in
the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct com-
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pie, that when a male supervisor is taunting a male employee, he is not doing
so because the employee is "male," thereby creating an environment hostile
to all men. Therefore, the discrimination is presumptively not based on "sex"
or "gender" regardless of how intensely the harassment focuses on sex, sexu-
ality, or gender roles.
There are several distinct problems with the courts' narrow interpreta-
tion of the phrase "because of sex." Most critically, courts have bifurcated
personhood into "male" and "female" components, attributing distinct char-
acteristics to men and women as if they apply universally and without varia-
tion. By using "male" and "female" as opposing binaries, courts accept the
validity of biological sexual differences, perpetuating stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes, and ignoring normative gender ideology. The result is
penalization of gender atypicality and devaluation of people who are
feminized. 88
Basing hostile environment claims on genital identity is impractical
based on the fundamental fact that physically, not all people fall neatly into
the category "male" or "female." Biologically speaking, there are at least
five sexes that run along the spectrum from female to male. There are three
major genital subgroups in addition to those of male and female:
hermaphrodites, who possess one testis and one ovary; male pseudo-
hermaphrodites, who have testes and some aspects of female genitalia but no
ovaries; and female pseudo-hermaphrodites, who have ovaries and some as-
pects of the male genitalia, but lack testes.89 "If the state and legal system
have an interest in maintaining a two-party sexual system, they are defying
nature." 90 Other definitional problems arise in the transgender context,
where courts have differed in defining what is a male and what is a female. 91
Given the judicial confusion regarding the precise definitions of "male" and
"female," basing civil protections on such a distinction makes little sense.
More fundamentally, emphasis on biological sex mandates the subordi-
nation of women, feminized men, and sexual minorities. Such a narrow view
of sexual identity perpetuates the existence of traditional gender identity and
behavioral norms which devalue women and sexual minorities. The para-
digm of genital identity establishes and maintains the hierarchical differentia-
tion between men and women. "'Male' is the grammatical and semantical
parative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998);
see also Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
88. See Valdes, supra note 78, at 170.
89. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes are There?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at
A29.
90. Id.
91. Compare In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Stark Co. Prob. Ct. 1987) (holding male-
to-female transsexual was still considered male under Ohio law), with M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,
208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding male-to-female transsexual was considered female under
New Jersey law for purposes of marriage).
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norm that relegates 'female' to a deviant and derivative status."' 92 Sexual
identity is then elided with sexual behavior,93 and any deviance from ex-
pected gender roles is punished.
The courts have arguably chosen the least relevant aspect of "sex" as a
factor on which to base sexual harassment determinations. Notably, most
important differences between men and women are grounded not in biology,
but in gender normativity.9 4 "In every way that matters, sex bears an epiphe-
nomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close examination, almost
every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown
to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles."' 95 Biological distinc-
tions, therefore, are much less informative than gender distinctions. It is gen-
der, and the hierarchy of gender differences, which transforms an anatomical
difference into a socially relevant distinction. Accordingly, what it means to
be a woman, and what it means to be a man should be understood not in
biological terms, but according to gender normativity, and the behavioral as-
pects of sexual identity.
Basing sexual harassment claims on biological sex is not only illogical,
but also impractical, as biological sex is often inseparable from the other as-
pects of sex noted above. As one historian explained, "[s]ociety and the indi-
vidual are inseparable; they are necessary and complementary to each other,
not opposites .... As soon as we are born, the world gets to work on us and
transforms us from merely biological into social units."'96 Judith Butler pro-
poses that even sex is socially constructed, suggesting that in fact there is no
real distinction between sex and gender.97 She explains:
If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to
this "sex" except by means of its construction, then it appears not
only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that "sex" becomes some-
thing like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed as a
prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access. 98
Disaggregating sex and gender, as a result, is quite difficult if not
impossible.99
92. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 850, 876 (1985).
93. See Tamsin Wilton, Genital Identities: An Idiosyncratic Foray into the Gendering of Sex-
ualities, in SEXUALIZING THE SOCIAL 102, 104 (Lisa Adkins and Vicki Merchant eds., 1996).
94. See Franke, supra note 74, at 2.
95. Id. Franke opines that "we all possess a degree of sexual agency beyond the rigid deter-
minism of biology, or the bleak overdeterminism of strong constructionism." Id. at 8.
96. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 36 (1961).
97. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MAITER 5 (1993) (stating "[w]hen the sex/gender
distinction is joined with a notion of radical linguistic constructivism ... the 'sex' which is re-
ferred to as prior to gender will itself be a postulation, a construction, offered within language, as
that which is prior to language, prior to construction"); see also Martha Ertman, Contractual
Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1107,
1163 (1996).
98. BUTLER, supra note 97, at 5.
99. See Franke, supra note 74, at 31-40.
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Traditional, antiquated notions of sexuality, where one's biological sex
would determine his or her gender identity, both self and societal, which in
turn would account for the person's sexual behavior, are no longer accepted.
In today's society of advanced technological and medical possibilities, a soci-
ety which has become more tolerant of social diversity, we cannot and are no
longer required to make the same assumptions about a person's sexuality.
The concept of "sex" today goes well beyond mere genital anatomy and en-
compasses the totality of an individual's sexual identity.10° It is the feminine
gender traits, and not the genital organs with which they are associated, that
are the signifiers of the sex-based power imbalance Title VII was designed to
eradicate.
Male victims of hostile environment harassment by other males tend to
be either homosexual, perceived by co-workers as homosexual, or outwardly
demonstrate feminine characteristics. 10 1 In all these situations, arguably, the
employee is being harassed because of his gender role identity-that is, the
harassment is motivated by the employee's failure to live up to gender expec-
tations. The same traits or behavior exhibited by a man would not be objec-
tionable to the harasser if displayed by a woman. It is the fact that they are
displayed by a man that inspires the harasser's hostility. Males who demon-
strate feminine characteristics fail to meet the image society has created for
men.10 2 When a person does not conform to socially constructed and ex-
pected gender roles, he is a target for sexual harassment. 10 3 That sexual har-
assment, in effect, is motivated by the employee's gender.
The Supreme Court has recognized that treatment in the workplace
based on gender stereotypes is actionable under Title VII. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,1° 4 a female senior manager was subject to verbal
abuse because she did not conform to the stereotypical female role; she was
denied partnership because the partners saw her as too aggressive.' 0 5 Specif-
ically, partner evaluation forms described her as "macho," and stated that she
"overcompensated for being a woman."' 01 6 When a partner explained the
decision to Hopkins, he told her to "walk more femininely, talk more femi-
100. In the case of transgendered people, for example,
one's sense of being a man or woman has no relation to the anatomical characteristics
that label her as male or female .... The sex of a transgendered person is only partially
based on the genitals; the rest is a sometimes strange admixture of complementary and
competing anatomical secondary physical characteristics, behaviors, life histories, psy-
chological presumptions, and stereotypes.
Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolu-
tion of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 296, 301 (Spring 1997).
101. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479, 2516 (1994).
102. See Case, supra note 72, at 12 (including as examples of adjectives "conventionally
coded as masculine . . . 'aggressive,' . . . 'dominant,' 'forceful,' . . . and 'strong"').
103. See Craig, supra note 8, at 112 (explaining that desire of heterosexual men to maintain
power and dominance motivates sexual harassment).
104. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
105. See id. at 234.
106. Id. at 235.
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ninely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.' 10 7
The Court noted that when an employer acts on the belief that a woman
should behave in a certain manner, the employer "has acted on the basis of
gender. ' 10 8 The court construed the phrase "because of sex" broadly stating:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for in forbidding employers to discriminate against individu-
als because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes. 10 9
This decision recognizes that gender is not based merely on physical attrib-
utes, but also on the expected roles a person should play in society.
Since women now have a cause of action based on gender role discrimi-
nation, so too should men. Title VII has been construed to protect men as
well as women1 0° and to give rise to a cause of action for "reverse discrimina-
tion" against members of the traditionally powerful group.1" When a man is
harassed for failing to behave aggressively, for not walking, talking or dress-
ing masculinely, or for not shamelessly bragging of sexual conquests of
women, that man is being harassed because of sex stereotypes.11 2 Based on
Hopkins, that man should have a cause of action under Title VII.
Despite this recognition of a cause of action for enforcement of gender
rules and the recognition that Title VII is meant to protect men as well as
women, most courts have not recognized the same gender-role cause of ac-
tion for men perceived as effeminate as they have for women perceived as
masculine. The Hopkins Court stated that it is unlawful to discriminate
against a woman for possessing male qualities. This ruling is understandable
given what the court deemed as a "Catch-22": if masculinity is associated
with power and success in the workplace, then women cannot succeed in the
workplace if they can be punished for displaying these masculine traits. In-
stead of extending the same protections to effeminate men, the courts have
permitted harassment based on an employee's gender traits to continue
107. Id. (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
108. Id. at 250.
109. Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
110. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (citing Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) and stating that Title VII "evinces a
congressional intent to 'strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women"'); Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)
(holding that employer's insurance plan violated Title VII by discriminating against employees'
husbands).
111. See, e.g., Twyman v. Secretary of Defense, 1995 WL 702388 (EEOC Nov. 9, 1995);
Gierut v. Postmaster General, 1994 WL 740064 (EEOC Aug. 25, 1994).
112. See Craig, supra note 8, at 111 (explaining that "[i]n reality, it is not the gender of the
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where the employee happens to be a male exhibiting female traits. These
individuals, however, are perhaps the most in need of protection in the work-
place. As one commentator has observed, since feminine qualities are uni-
versally devalued, a man who exhibits feminine qualities is "doubly despised,
for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for descending from his mascu-
line gender privilege to do so. '1113
By allowing harassers to single employees out for adverse treatment
based on possession of feminine characteristics, the courts implicitly sanction
continued disparaging treatment toward and devaluation of qualities deemed
feminine. Such derision of feminine traits perpetuates the gender imbalances
which Title VII was designed to alleviate. A jurisprudence which protects
women who act masculine but not men who act feminine preserves the gen-
der hierarchy in the workplace. It ensures workers equal rights to act mascu-
line, while preserving the privileged status of those masculine traits but
refusing protection to those who do not exhibit them. In effect, it allows
gender-role discrimination against one sex and not the other, and thus allows
adverse treatment because of sex. It also allows continued derision of the
feminine traits, but not the masculine, reinforcing gender-based power imbal-
ances. In effect, the Hopkins decision really marks the continuing devalua-
tion of qualities deemed feminine.
Some courts have justified this lacuna in the scope of Title VII by rea-
soning that harassment of effeminate men is based on sexual orientation,
which is not a protected trait under Title VII.114 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [hereinafter "Commission"] has held that Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, but that does not include sexual
preference or orientation.1 5 Male-on-male hostile environment harassment
is, however, rarely based exclusively on sexual preference. In fact, often the
victim, the harasser, or both are heterosexual." 6 The common thread run-
ning through same-sex hostile environment claims is that the employee is
perceived by his co-workers or supervisor as being gay or displaying feminine
characteristics. Discrimination against effeminate men should not be seen as
a mere subset of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. These em-
ployees are actually suffering from a form of gender discrimination against
women-"derision of some of the same qualities that make women targets
for sexual harassment. 11 7 The hostile environment sexual harassment in-
flicted on a woman-taunts that stress feminine sexual passivity and lack of
aggressiveness or power-is very similar to the sexual harassment inflicted
113. Case, supra note 72, at 3.
114. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) § 615.2 (1981)); Carreno v. IBEW Local No. 223, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81 (D.
Kan. 1990) (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2 (1981)).
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Navy, 01841210, 1459/A12 (EEOC 1986); Campbell
v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 01831816, 1077/B1 (EEOC 1983).
116. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90
F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th
Cir. 1996); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
117. Abrams, supra note 101, at 2516.
Spring 19981
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
on gay or effeminate men. This commonality reflects the "desire of certain
'active' masculine males to drive out of the workplace those they see as con-
taminating it with the taint of feminine passivity."'1 18
Feminine gender traits in men and gay male sexual orientation are far
from overlapping categories-there are, of course, effeminate men who are
not gay, and gay men who are not effeminate. 119 Hostile environment ha-
rassers generally target anyone who is effeminate, whether gay or not.120
While gender discrimination and sexual preference discrimination may coex-
ist in some instances, in many instances one exists and the other does not.
Thus, gender-based discrimination against effeminate men is a separate cate-
gory of discrimination that may converge with sexual orientation based dis-
crimination. When these two forms of discrimination coexist, it is virtually
impossible to discern whether a particular act of hostility was motivated by
gender discrimination or sexual orientation discrimination;121 such hostility is
likely motivated by both. Accordingly, although the Commission has held
that sexual orientation and preference do not receive protection under Title
VII, it has also held that sexual harassment is prohibited, regardless of the
sexual preference or orientation of the plaintiff.' 22 Even accepting that sex-
ual orientation is not a protected trait, these acts of hostility are nonetheless
motivated in part by gender-role reinforcement and punishment of males
who disrupt the gender hierarchy by relinquishing their masculine privilege
in favor of more feminine traits.' 23 This conduct is still motivated, at least in
significant part, by the sex and gender of the victim. Because this type of
conduct reinforces gender stereotypes and derision of feminine traits in the
workplace, it is an insidious form of sex discrimination that must be recog-
nized to serve the broad remedial purpose of Title VII. If consistently ap-
plied, Title VII jurisprudence would recognize a cause of action for such
conduct.124
The courts' interpretation of "because of sex" conflicts with the goals of
Title VII. Title VII is a remedial statute designed to "effectuate a broad so-
cial purpose."'1 25 As such, most courts have held that Title VII should be
118. Case, supra note 72, at 7.
119. See id. at 57.
120. See id. at 7 (arguing that motive behind sexual harassment is to drive out of workplace
all who contaminate "it with the taint of feminine passivity").
121. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of
Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992).
122. See McClain v. International Trade Comm'n, 01852958, 1755/Cl (1987).
123. See Case, supra note 72, at 3 (explaining that man who exhibits feminine qualities is
despised for not only exhibiting those qualities, but also "for descending from his masculine
gender privilege to do so"); Craig, supra note 8, at 112 (concluding that motivation behind sexual
orientation discrimination is desire of heterosexual men to maintain power and dominance
"both for their own sake and as a definitional sense of identity").
124. Even if the discrimination is based exclusively on sexual preference, the victim should
still have a cause of action. Such harassment would still be because of sex. See infra notes 146-
53 and accompanying text (discussing power hierarchies).
125. Allstate Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see
also ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHUZI, SEXUAL HARASSMENT FEDERAL LAW (1995)
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interpreted broadly. 126 The goal of Congress in passing Title VII was not to
give a person special protection due to certain characteristics. Rather, Title
VII was meant to lift all capricious and arbitrary hurdles to employment 127
and to afford employees "the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'1 28 Congresswoman May, ar-
guing in favor of the addition of "sex" in Title VII, described Title VII as an
"endeavor to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and
same opportunities.' 29 By limiting the reach of Title VII protection to peo-
ple possessing certain physical characteristics, courts are systematically and
legally discriminating against sexual minorities, in contravention of the goals
of the statute. Inclusion of the socially constructed elements of gender in
hostile work environment analysis would alleviate the disparate impact which
the current Title VII jurisprudence has on sexual minorities.
The most logical and fair interpretation of "because of sex" is a defini-
tion that encompasses all the aspects of "sex" embedded within that term,
including sexual activity, sexual behavior, sexual anatomy, sexual identity,
gender stereotypes, or any other issues relating to sex and gender, as long as
the conduct implicates a power imbalance. To state a cause of action under
Title VII, the plaintiff must show that he or she perceived the conduct as
undesirable or offensive and that it was not solicited or invited. 130 In Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,131 the United States Supreme Court stated that in
hostile environment cases, courts must evaluate the totality of the circum-
stances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or whether it unreasona-
bly interferes with an employee's work.132 This standard focuses on the be-
(citing Joines v. Department of Army, 01832141, 1179/C14 (1984) and explaining that Title VII is
remedial statute intended "so far as possible [to] eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past
as well as bar like discrimination in the future").
126. See, e.g., EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n., 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.
1982) (citing Cincinatti Ass'n for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982) and Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Quijano v.
University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970)); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831
(3d Cir. 1979) (citing Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1977)); Craig
v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing Bell v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(citing Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d
827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (citing EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany
Corp., 449 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974)); Hauck v. Xerox Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1340, 1349 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), affd, 649 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d
455 (5th Cir. 1970)); cf. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967).
127. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975).
128. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
129. Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400 n.5 (D. Minn. 1996)
(citing 110 CONG. REc. 2577, 2583 (1964)).
130. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
131. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
132. See id. at 23.
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havior of the alleged harasser rather than on the victim. Regardless of who
the victim is, any sufficiently inappropriate insertion of sexually explicit lan-
guage or behavior into the workplace should be considered sexual harass-
ment. Prohibiting proscribed types of conduct diverts attention away from
the gender and sexual preference of the victim, toward what employees, with-
out regard to race, class, gender or sexual preference, are entitled to expect
when they enter into the employment relationship.
In order to determine whether the conduct was inappropriate, the court
must examine its motivations, which in turn requires an evaluation of the
power relationship between the parties. The root of sexual harassment is
generally not sexual attraction, but the desire to assert power over an individ-
ual. 133 The harassers exploit what they consider to be a weakness in their
victims to reassert their superiority and to keep the victims subordinated.
134
The gender role played and the gender traits exhibited by the employee help
dictate the power differentials between the parties.
Some courts have relied on the idea that sexual harassment is about
power to exclude same-gender sexual harassment cases from the purview of
Title VII.135 In Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,136 for example, a male plaintiff sued
his male employers for sexual harassment. He did not claim that his harass-
ers were homosexual. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court emphasized
that Title VII was meant to remedy an "imbalance by the powerful which
results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group .... The
'sexual harassment' that is actionable under Title VII 'is the exploitation of a
133. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)
(identifying sexual harassment as act of power); Craig, supra note 8, at 110 (stating "courts-
both the ones that have recognized same-sex harassment and the ones that have not-do recog-
nize that the objective of such harassment is maintenance and abuse of power and dominance,
rather than a real desire for sex"). It is well-accepted today that rape, sexual harassment in its
most extreme form, is a crime of violence rather than sexual attraction. See, e.g., SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILLS: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975) (characterizing rape as
widespread and violent effort to assert power and possession over women's bodies); Peggy
Miller & Nancy Biele, Twenty Years Later: The Unfinished Revolution, in TRANSFORMING A
RAPE CULTURE 47, 49 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993) (stating that rape in all its forms "is an
act of violence, a violation of the victim's spirit and body, and a perversion of power ...");
Alexandra Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovinia, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST
WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINIA 82, 84-85 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) (explaining that
rape is a way to demonstrate power and to "humiliate and annihilate the enemy" and is also a
tool of "ethnic cleansing"); Jonathan Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War:
American Prison Law After Twenty-five Years, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 60 (1987) ("Certainly
prison rape is not primarily committed by homosexuals, so sexual gratification is not an adequate
explanation. The connection between prison rape and the prison economy demonstrates that
power is a crucial element in prison life."). Sexual harassment is often viewed as a mild form of
rape, so undoubtedly the motivations of the two crimes are similar. See Nan Stein, No Laughing
Matter: Sexual Harassment in K-12 Schools, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 310, 317-18
(comparing child's motivation in bullying to motivation behind sexual harassment).
134. See Craig, supra note 8, at 106, 112 (explaining both that many men see qualities typi-
cally regarded as "feminine" as denoting weakness and that motivation behind sexual harass-
ment is desire of heterosexual men to maintain power and dominance).
135. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I1. 1988).
136. Id.
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powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but
less powerful person." 137 Thus, according to the Goluszek court, only those
forms of sexual harassment that made the victim feel inferior because of the
victim's gender were actionable. 138 As the plaintiff could not show any im-
balance of power between himself and other males, and he could not show
that he worked "in an environment that treated males as inferior," or where
an "anti-male environment" existed, the conduct was not actionable.
139
The Goluszek court assumed that the power disparity that exists when a
man harasses a woman could not exist between two men because the imbal-
ance of power is predicated on a notion of inferiority of the other biological
sex. If that were true, it would not be possible for any man to be sexually
harassed because men are traditionally the dominant sex. The flaw in this
reasoning is striking. This logic rests on a simplistic view of gender-based
power dynamics which assumes that all traits that are discriminated against to
perpetuate a male and masculine dominated workplace are possessed solely
by women. Because gender is socially constructed and determined by traits
other than genitalia, it is also possible for a man to possess such feminine
gender traits and the concomitant lack of power.
"[Plower is socially constructed. .. ."140 Power "only exists in action"
14 1
and operates "through roles assigned and assumed in social practices."'1 42 In
every day life, there are certain symbols or characteristics that communicate
power, including gender, age, skin color, and physical condition.143 Certain
members of society are able to "secure compliance" from other members on
a regular basis. Over time, these people are viewed as "powerful"-the im-
age of power actually becomes the source of power. 144 Through our life ex-
periences we learn to associate certain characteristics with power. "From this
perspective, power is a socially constructed and mediated capacity that is
manifest and immanent throughout all human experience ....
137. Id. at 1456 (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984)).
138. See id. at 1456 (citing Note, supra note 137, at 1451-52).
139. Id.
140. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in Legal
Relations (with Special Application to Unconscionability and Arbitration), 33 WILLAMETrE L.
REv. 67, 74 (Winter 1997).
141. Id. at 71 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 89 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980)).
142. Id. at 72 (quoting Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation,
60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 881 (1985)).
143. See id. at 73.
144. As explained by one social scientist, Steven L. Winter,
[Power is] not an external force that operates on a passive victim. [Rather,] it is the
emergent quality of a reciprocal social relation. Just as its assertion enacts power, def-
erence can generate or sustain it. Power is the product of an interplay of actions and
attitudes between social actors, each equipped with corresponding or complementary
images of a particular social relation. Thus, what produces "power" must also be in the
head of those who are its subjects.
Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 VA. L. REv. 721, 741-42 (1996).
145. Schwartz, supra note 140, at 74.
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Society has constructed a power hierarchy of genders where maleness is
associated with power and femaleness is associated with passivity and weak-
ness. 146 Maleness is a symbol which communicates not only the physical at-
tributes of a person, but the social roles that person plays as well. It is a role
that has been reinforced over time by social interaction. Masculinity can be
communicated not only through outward visual appearances, but also
through behavior. Thus, a person who behaves in a masculine way communi-
cates power to others-power that can be used to control the behavior of
others. A person who does not behave in a masculine way communicates
weakness and the ability to be controlled. 147 Under the existing gender-
based power dynamics, such persons communicate a lack of power and are
vulnerable to an abuse of power. The result of this social construction of
power is that what is seen as masculine-aggressive, ambitious, assertive,
competitive, dominant, forceful, or independent behavior, is more highly val-
ued than what is seen as feminine-understanding, warm, gentle, or passive
behavior.148
Many heterosexual men desire to maintain the socially constructed per-
ception of male strength to reinforce their own sense of identity and position
of privilege in the gender hierarchy.' 49 This desire motivates sex discrimina-
tion against those who do not communicate the same sense of power, includ-
ing women and feminine men.150 When a male communicates feminine
characteristics, that male communicates a lack of power.' 5 1 Other males
around him may exploit this perceived vulnerability by accentuating their
own masculine characteristics. To some degree, stereotypical notions of mas-
culinity are tied to images of sexual conquest. Thus, men may accentuate
their own masculinity through sexual conversation, exposing themselves, sex-
ual touching, or even threats of sexual force. In essence, these males would
then be using "matters pertaining to sex," their own sexuality, and the promi-
nent role of this sexuality in their gender identity and power status to rein-
force and demonstrate their own masculinity. In doing so, they exert their
power over another male who fails to exhibit the same masculine characteris-
tics. "Seeing a feminine man evokes a tremendous amount of anxiety in
many men; it triggers an awareness of their own feminine qualities, such as
146. Compare Case, supra note 72, at 12 (explaining that adjectives generally regarded as
"masculine" include "'aggressive,... 'dominant,' 'forceful,' ... and 'strong"'), with Craig, supra
note 8, at 106, 112 (explaining that qualities regarded as "feminine" such as passivity and sensi-
tivity are seen as sign of weakness).
147. See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 73 (using example of white male and explaining that
he can communicate power based, inter alia, on his gender).
148. See Case, supra note 72 at 6, 12.
149. See Case, supra note 72, at 3 (explaining that many men despise men who exhibit
feminine qualities because in doing so, they are "descending from [the] masculine gender privi-
lege"); Craig, supra note 8, at 112 (explaining that heterosexual men desire maintenance of
power and dominance for own sake and as definitional sense of identity).
150. See Craig, supra note 8, at 112 (concluding that desire of heterosexual men to maintain
power and dominance is motivation behind sexual harassment).
151. See id. at 106 (explaining that many men consider "feminine qualities" to be sign of
weakness).
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passivity or sensitivity, which they see as being a sign of weakness.' 5 2
Harassing these men is a way of maintaining their own power.' 53
The social construction of power also subordinates sexual minorities as
well as feminized people in the gender hierarchy. Because of the conflation
of sex, gender and sexuality, society has come to expect not only certain gen-
der traits, but also a prescribed set of sexual behavior from people according
to their biological sex. If a person's gender and sexual performance is incon-
sistent with what is expected of his or her biological sex, that person is
subordinated in the gender hierarchy. As a result, heterosexual males are
privileged to enforce hegemonic paradigms of sexuality and sex roles on
others less powerful in the gender hierarchy.
It is also clear from the courts' treatment of reverse discrimination cases
that a man can be sexually harassed based on powerlessness, even if he does
not display feminine or gender-inappropriate traits.154 Although the gender
hierarchy often informs our understanding of the power relationship between
two people, power exists outside of gender. There is a myriad of other ways
in which one person can come to have power over another person, particu-
larly in the workplace. Employers, by definition, have significant power over
their employees because of their ability to punish or reward their employees.
In addition, the "boss" or "supervisor" is often a person who possesses cer-
tain qualities. To be a successful boss, a person may need to be aggressive.
Aggressiveness is often viewed as a male quality. As aggressive people find
themselves in a position of power, that becomes one image of power. A male
then, need only show an aggressive tendency to fit the role of a leader as
created by social views.
Employers may have additional power over their employees based on
economic and social inequalities likely to be found between the two groups.
When jobs are scarcest, the disparity in bargaining power between an em-
ployer and employee is greatest. At such times, the employer generally has a
greater ability to affect the employee's life, by threatening to fire the em-
ployee, failing to give the employee a raise, or giving the employee more
menial or less satisfying work. Although an employee can threaten to quit,
such a threat will have little meaning when the job market allows the em-
ployer to hire easily new, qualified people. For these reasons, it is possible
for a man to be sexually harassed by a woman or by another man who is his
superior or in a position of power over him.
CONCLUSION
Same-sex sexual harassment is an assertion of power in which the har-
asser subjects a subordinate to adverse working conditions based on gender-
related traits. Even in the narrowest anatomical sense of the word, this har-
152. Id.
153. See id. at 112 (explaining that sexual harassment is motivated by desire of heterosexual
men to maintain power and dominance).
154. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
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assment is based on sex. It should be actionable, regardless of the biological
sex or sexual preference of the employee. Any person who endures the com-
ments or behavior of a supervisor or a co-worker that pertain to matters of
sexual activity, sexual identity, or gender-stereotyped traits should have a
cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII, especially if the gender
traits singled out by the harasser communicate a lack of power under tradi-
tional and stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate behavior. This read-
ing of Title VII would include protection for homosexuals, transgendered
persons, and all other sexual minorities as long as their sexual or gender-
related characteristics did not impede their job performance. Sexual harass-
ment should be actionable as long as the plaintiff can show he was singled out
based on his exhibition of sexual or gender-related traits that, in the tradi-
tional masculine-dominated gender hierarchy, signify a lesser degree of
power and dominance than the masculine, heterosexual harasser.
By focusing on the connections between all the different facets embod-
ied in the term "sex," it is apparent that "sex, gender, and sexual orientation
jointly motivate acts of discrimination that are presently perceived as being
'based' only on one of these three endpoints."'1 55 Sexual harassment is
founded on the presumption that traditional gender roles should be enforced.
When a male superior treats a female employee like a sex object, or makes
her surroundings highly sexualized, he is exploiting his power over her in
order to force her into "the traditional, feminine role of submissive sex part-
ners to men" and remind her that she is "expected to be feminine and defer-
ential towards men-to adhere to traditional gender roles. ' 156 Ultimately,
he is inappropriately introducing sex into the workplace and discriminating
against her because of her gender. When a male superior taunts a male em-
ployee who is homosexual, or who displays feminine characteristics, by
crassly discussing sexual conquests, or forcing the subordinate to view hetero-
sexual pornography, that superior is similarly asserting his power by exploit-
ing the employee's failure to act according to expected gender roles. Just like
the male-female scenario, the employer is improperly bringing sex and gen-
der into the workplace and discriminating against his subordinate based on
the roles persons of that gender are expected to play.
Same-sex sexual harassment can be just as frequent, pervasive, severe,
threatening, humiliating, and disruptive to work as opposite-sex harassment.
Every time courts deny an employee a cause of action for same-sex hostile
work environment, they are giving employers the green light to sexually har-
ass men who violate gender stereotypes. As long as failure to comply with
strict gender-role stereotypes is viewed as grounds for abuse, and employers
are allowed to administer the abuse, society will continue to perceive these
men as weak and exploit them.
155. Valdes, supra note 78, at 169.
156. Craig, supra note 8, at 107-08.
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